When an ex tries to rewrite what was said.
The pattern is familiar: a message is sent, it's threatening or coercive or just plainly cruel, you screenshot it. Months later, when you bring it up — in a restraining-order hearing, in a custody negotiation, in a conversation with a mutual friend — the response is some flavor of 'I never said that' or 'you're misremembering' or 'that screenshot is photoshopped.' The screenshot alone proves nothing, because anyone can edit a screenshot in Preview. A sealed receipt proves the file existed in that exact form at the timestamp shown, signed by a key we publish, and anchored to a public blockchain so even we can't backdate it. It doesn't prove the ex sent the message — but combined with the platform's own records (which the ex can no longer easily delete), it turns 'your word against theirs' into something a court will weigh.
When this scenario hits you
- An ex sends a threatening text, then deletes their copy of the conversation. You still have yours.
- Custody negotiation: the other parent now claims they 'never agreed' to a co-parenting arrangement that was hashed out over WhatsApp three months ago.
- Restraining order hearing — the magistrate wants chronology, and 'I sent it on a Tuesday' is not chronology. A signed timestamp is.
- Friend or family group chat: someone said something cruel, deleted it the next morning, and is now insisting it never happened.
- The other person is preparing a defamation suit and you need to lock down what was actually written, before any platform-side log expires.
What you actually do
- 01
Screenshot the conversation in full context.
Include sender name, date stamps from the messaging app, and ideally the message before and after for context. Don't crop. The receipt hashes pixel bytes, so the more context inside the frame, the more evidence the single hash covers. If the platform shows a 'delivered' or 'read' indicator, include that.
- 02
Seal each screenshot in /seal.
Drop the file; your browser hashes it locally with SHA-256 plus two perceptual hashes; only the hashes are posted to our worker. We sign and timestamp. Within thirty minutes the receipt has an external OpenTimestamps anchor, after which no one — including us — can forge a different timestamp for that hash.
- 03
Save the stamped PNG and the receipt URL somewhere safe.
Two copies, two locations. The stamped image has a QR code; scanning it lands a verifier on receipts.you/r/<id>. Print the receipt URL on paper if your lawyer wants it in the file; it'll still verify against the digital screenshot at any point in the future.
- 04
When the gaslighting starts, the receipt does the talking.
If the ex now claims the screenshot is doctored, anyone can drop your screenshot on /verify. The verdict ladder either returns identical (byte-for-byte match) or recompressed (same image, re-encoded by a platform). Either way, it's a public, externally-anchored proof that the file existed at the timestamp shown.
- 05
Pair the receipt with the platform's own logs if the matter goes formal.
WhatsApp, iMessage, Signal all retain server-side metadata (delivery receipts, message IDs) that a court can subpoena. The receipt fixes the screenshot file; the platform records corroborate what the underlying message was. Together they form a chain of custody no editorial flourish from the other side can break.
Why the receipt holds
- The receipt timestamp is anchored to a public blockchain via OpenTimestamps. We cannot rewrite the chain; nobody can.
- The signature is verifiable offline with openssl + our published public key. If we ever disappeared, your evidence still verifies.
- Both the original screenshot AND the QR-stamped version are hashed — pasting the QR onto a fake image fails verification immediately.
- Perceptual hashes (pHash + dHash, AND-gated) recover the verdict even after WhatsApp/iMessage/Signal recompress the file during a re-export — useful because evidence often travels through 'export chat' rather than the original file.
Where the receipt stops
- It doesn't prove the ex was the sender. The messaging app shows a name and a phone number, but a phone number is not a courtroom identification. Pair the receipt with the platform's own records when stakes warrant.
- It doesn't prove the conversation wasn't taken out of context. Seal long contiguous screenshots, not isolated single-message crops, if context is going to be disputed.
- It doesn't prevent the ex from sealing their own version of events with their own receipt. Receipts are not adversarial; they're cryptographic timestamps of files. Two opposing receipts can both be valid and still tell different stories — that's what cross-examination is for.
Specific questions about this scenario
Is a receipts.you receipt admissible in court?
Receipts are cryptographic timestamp evidence and are generally admissible — but the weight a court assigns is up to the court. In the US, FRE 901 admissibility for screenshot evidence is well-established; receipts add a signed, externally-anchored layer that makes authentication straightforward. For high-stakes proceedings (custody, restraining orders, defamation), tell your lawyer you have signed, externally-anchored timestamps and let them advise.
Should I tell the ex I sealed the screenshot?
That's strategy, not technology. Some people seal-and-don't-tell so the receipts surface only if needed; others lead with the receipt URL as a deterrent. The receipt itself is silent — it doesn't ping the sender, doesn't show up in any feed, doesn't leak metadata about who sealed it.
What if the ex deletes the messages on their phone — does that affect my receipt?
Not at all. Your receipt is about your screenshot file. Whether the other person still has the conversation is irrelevant to whether your file existed at the timestamp shown. Many messaging-platform deletions only delete the local copy anyway; the platform's server-side logs often persist for years and can be subpoenaed if needed.
Can I seal a screenshot of a deleted message that I only have a forwarded copy of?
Yes — you're sealing the bytes you have. The receipt proves your file existed at the timestamp; it doesn't claim to be the original message thread. Be transparent about provenance if the matter goes formal.
Is there any privacy risk to using receipts.you for sensitive material?
We never see the image — only a SHA-256 hash and a perceptual hash. Both are one-way; the image cannot be reconstructed from them. Our database row is about 400 bytes per receipt and contains no content. If you're worried about local exposure, seal from an incognito tab; nothing about the seal touches localStorage.
Related scenarios
Memory is negotiable. The receipt is not.
Drop the screenshot, walk away with a dated, signed, externally-anchored proof. Image stays in your browser; the receipt verifies forever.